METHODS FOR ENSURING THE INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICITY OF MILITARY ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Authors
  • Giyosjon Jumaev Abdivaxobovich

    Artificial intellegance and digital technologies, Tashkent International University of Financial Management and Technologies, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

    Author

  • Turapov Sherzod Nurmatovich

    Head of Department of Act and Military Communication Institute, Tashkent, Uzbekistan

    Author

Keywords:
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Abstract

Background. Orders, intelligence reports and logistics records in military information systems must remain unaltered, be attributable to a known originator, and stay verifiable for years, often over degraded or disconnected networks. Checksums, stored hashes, shared-key message authentication codes and digital signatures are all used for this purpose, but they protect against different threats. Objective. To establish experimentally which threats each mechanism detects, to propose a layered scheme that covers all of them, and to measure its computational cost. Methods. Five schemes (CRC-32, stored SHA-256, HMAC-SHA256 with a group key, Ed25519 signatures, and Ed25519 signatures with a trusted timestamp and a hash-chained ledger) were implemented and tested with 2,000 trials per attack against six attack classes: random modification, modification with tag recomputation, forged authorship by an insider, rollback to an older authentic version, backdating by an author, and deletion. Hashing, signing and ledger verification costs were benchmarked. Results. All schemes detected random modification. CRC-32 and stored SHA-256 detected nothing else; HMAC-SHA256 additionally detected recomputation by an outsider; Ed25519 signatures additionally detected forged authorship; only the layered scheme detected rollback, backdating and deletion (6 of 6 attack classes, with no false alarms on genuine records). Hashing dominated the cost: 130.8 ms for a 50 MB document, while one signature verification took about 0.20 ms. A Merkle inclusion proof for a 262,144-entry ledger verified in about 17 µs, against about 262 ms for a linear chain walk. Conclusions. Integrity alone is not authenticity, and authenticity alone is not freshness or completeness. A signature, a trusted timestamp and an append-only ledger together close the gaps at a modest cost. The attack results follow from the design of each mechanism and confirm the implementation, not field performance; timings are from one machine.

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Published
2026-10-12
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